The Supreme Court last week significantly limited the doctrine of preemption as it applies to automobile manufacturers who choose a particular method allowed by a safety standard in the manufacture of automobiles. In Williamson v. Mazda ___ U.S. ___, No. 08-1314 (2011), Mazda had chosen to use a lap-only restraint system for the middle or “aisle” position in the back seat of a minivan. Thanh Williamson was killed in an accident while in the aisle position. The Williamson family sued in California State court, claiming the lack of a shoulder restraint system constituted a defect. The state trial court dismissed on the pleadings and California Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, both relying on Geier v. American Honda, 529 U.S. 861 (1993) which had found that an earlier version of the regulation involved – FMVSS 208 (requiring installation of passive restraint devices) - preempted a state tort suit. The 1989 version of FMVSS 208 had provided manufacturers with a choice of lap-only or lap-and-shoulder restraint devices for the middle position seat. However, that version had basically stated a cost objective for allowing the choice. The Supreme Court, with a vote of 8-0 reversed (Justice Kagan recusing) reversed and remanded because the Court found that the reasoning behind the regulation was different than in Geier. The Court emphasized that in Geier, requiring an airbag system under that statute would have “stood as an obstacle” to the purpose of the regulation, which had been to get manufacturers to implement passive restraint systems while also being able to refine the safety of such systems. In Williamson, the Court found that there was no such motivation on the part of the DOT – the choice was given simply as a cost concern, and thus there was a distinction drawn between Williamson and Geier.
Interestingly, there were two concurring opinions filed. Justice Sotomayor went to great lengths to stress the importance of the Solicitor General’s opinions on the matter (the Solicitor General at the time just happened to be now-Justice Kagan). Also, Justice Thomas concurred, but stressed a large degree of displeasure with the majority’s reliance on the DOT’s reasons or the Solicitor General’s position – he believed that because the saving clause of the National Traffic and Safety Act “explicitly preserves state common-law actions”, the debate need not go further. So while the Williamson decision was indeed 8-0, it was certainly not unanimous.
What manufacturers are faced with now is that unless the DOT basically comes out and says “we’re really concerned about something important” when making a regulation and giving manufacturers a choice, then there likely will be no preemption found. Ford found out the effect quickly, as this week it had a preemption case returned by the Supreme Court to the court below for consideration under the Williamson guidelines (Priester v. Ford Motor Co., 10-668). So, the days of reliance on Geier seem to be over for the most part. Absent a DOT-stated objective to the contrary, manufacturers will apparently be opening themselves up to tort actions by making any design choice other than the maximum standard prescribed.