On March 27, 2013, a jury in federal district court in Bridgeport, Connecticut awarded Cara Munn, a 20-year-old woman who formerly attended the Hotchkiss School  in Lakeville, Connecticut, $41,750,000 in a case styled Orson D. Munn III et al. v. The Hotchkiss School, No. 3:09cv0919 (SRU).  The case raises important issues concerning "duty" and "assumption of risk."

The jury determined that Hotchkiss, a prestigious prep school, was negligent for two reasons: (1) in failing to warn plaintiff before or during a school sponsored trip to China during the summer of 2007 about the risk of insect-borne illness on the trip; and (2) in failing to ensure that plaintiff used protective measures to prevent infection by an insect-borne disease while visiting Mt. Pan in China.

In an article appearing in the Connecticut Law Tribune (Vol. 39, No. 13), titled "Tick Bite Leads To Big Verdict," it was reported that the school was faulted specifically  for not warning plaintiff (and her parents) that she would be traveling in mountainous and forested terrain. As a result, the jury determined that the plaintiff was not aware that she had to protect herself from insects by wearing bug repellent, long sleeve shirts and trousers, and by avoiding brushy undergrowth.

According to Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, Ms. Munn's parents had Cara flown back to the United States in July '07, where she was hospitalized for several weeks at Weill Cornell Medical Center in the pediatric ICU and later at the Rusk Institute for extensive rehab.  As a result of her severe encephalitis, plaintiff suffered severe neurological and motor injuries, including permanent loss of speech. 

The case, which will almost certainly be appealed, raises significant issues concerning duty and the assumption of personal responsibility by parents who agree to have their child travel abroad for educational purposes. Apart from the obvious differences in food, culture and living conditions, traveling abroad carries many potential risks, some of which are foreseeable and some of which are not. Stepping back from the facts presented by this particularly tragic case, should a high school be held responsible for failing to prevent a student from being bitten by a tick in China? What if the tick had bitten her during a field trip to Central Park?

Assuming that the Second Circuit upholds this verdict, what does this case portend for high schools and colleges that plan educational trips abroad? Is there some bright line test that would provide guidance to a school evaluating the safety concerns of its students? Short of wrapping all of their students in cocoons and keeping them closely monitored in classroom settings, how can any school protect against the kind of unforeseen liability presented by this case?  

Hotchkiss' Answer to Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint states that plaintiffs' claims should be barred by the doctrine of assumption of risk.  The school argues that plaintiffs voluntarily assumed the risk of travel to China as evidenced by their execution of the pre-trip Agreement, Waiver, and Release of Liability.  In this agreement, plaintiffs agreed that Hotchkiss "would not be responsible for any injury to person or property caused by anything other than its sole negligence or willful misconduct" (emphasis added). Would legal weight did the court give to this release? 

Based upon the Verdict Form presented to the jury, it would appear that the trial court gave short shrift to the language in the release.  The jury was asked the following questions: (1) Was one or more of Hotchkiss' negligent acts or omissions a cause-in-fact of Cara Munn's injuries; and (2) Was one or more of Hotchkiss' negligent acts or omissions a substantial factor, that acting alone or in conjunction with other factors, brought about Cara's injuries? 

Those inquiries are a lot different from asking whether the jury finds that Hotchkiss' "sole negligence or willful misconduct" caused the injuries.  Although the jury determined that plaintiff did not contribute to any degree whatsoever in causing her injuries, it was not asked to consider whether other intervening factors played any role in causing Cara's injuries.

There are circumstances when a school can and should be held responsible when things go wrong on a school outing.  Three examples come quickly to mind: (1) sending kids into a war zone despite State Department warnings; (2) sending kids abroad into an epidemic earlier identified by the CDC; or (3) taking non-swimmers for an ocean swim outing without proper supervision. 

How is Munn different from these scenarios?  Is a random bug bite as foreseeable, if at all, as the kinds of risks discussed in the three scenarios above? According to Hotchkiss' summary judgment memorandum, the CDC reported that plaintiff was the first U.S. traveler ever to have reported TBE after traveling in China. Moreover, no U.S. traveler since plaintiff has developed the disease.  Therefore, how unreasonable was it for Hotchkiss not to take precautions against a risk of harm that arguably had such a slight likelihood of taking place?  Shouldn't plaintiffs have had to prove that the defendant was on prior notice of the existence of circumstances that could give rise to an injury? 

Plaintiffs' expert, Peter Tarlow once led a group of children, including his own son, on a tour of Israel.  If a child on that Israel tour had been unexpectedly assaulted by someone holding anti-Zionist views, would Dr. Tarlow expect to be held responsible for any resultant injury because he was "on notice" of decades of endemic unrest in the region? 

Two strong CT trial lawyers squared off against each for this eight day trial--for the plaintiffs, Antonio Ponvert of Koskoff, Koskoff & Bieder, one of the New England plaintiff bar's preeminent firms, and for the defendant, Penny Q. Seaman of Wiggin & Dana, one of Connecticut's oldest and most accomplished firms.  The bar should expect to see excellent post-trial briefing as events unfold.  

*This was originally posted on April 5 on Toxic Tort Litigation Blog. Read the current post here

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On March 11, 2013, the National Football League and the General Electric Co. announced that they are teaming up to create a Head Health Initiative that will provide $60 million dollars to assist leading neurologists in researching traumatic brain injuries and developing technology able to monitor these ailments.  $40 million will go towards developing imaging technologies, and the remaining $20 million will be available to others who seek to prevent, identify, and develop treatments for brain injuries.  Athletic apparel company Under Armour will also be providing $5 million dollars in support for the cause.

Jeff Immelt, GE Chairman and CEO, indicated that scientific support for the research would be top-notch.  “We’re trying to do this with the best minds anywhere in the world,” he noted in a news conference.  He declared that the funds would utilize GE’s expertise in sophisticated diagnostic imaging technology to increase general scientific knowledge on brain functions, noting “With this initiative, we will advance our research and apply our learning to sports-related concussions, brain injuries suffered by members of the military and neurodegenerative diseases such as Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s.  Advancing brain science will help families everywhere.”

NFL commissioner Roger Goodell also expressed satisfaction with the initiative, stating: “The NFL has made tremendous progress in making the game safe and more exciting.  But we have more work to do.  Our collaboration with GE and Under Armour . . . puts us on an accelerated path to progress . . that will benefit athletes, the military, and all members of society.”

As orignally published at www.sportslawinsider.com March 13, 2013.
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Plaintiff Susan Early was allegedly injured while a passenger on one of Carnival Corporation’s ships.  A claim was initiated, then (apparently) resolved.  The mediator in the matter filed his report on November 21, 2012.  That report stated that the parties had settled subject to the condition that the Court retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement and determine the issue of a possible LMSA if one were needed.  Early motioned the Court for Determination of Whether a Medicare Set Aside is Required.  The terms of the settlement negotiations were:

1) Carnival will pay Early an undisclosed sum;
2) Each party will pay its own attorney’s fees and costs;
3) Early will execute a release for Carnival;
4) Carnival will be responsible for the mediator’s fees; and 
5) The parties DISAGREE on whether an LMSA was required, but agree to submit the issue to the Court and to abide by its determination.

Early’s motion argued that an LMSA was not required under the Medicare Secondary Payer (“MSP”) Act.   Carnival filed its response, urging the Court to conclude that an LMSA was required.

Analysis.
The Court begins by providing a succinct recitation of the MSP Act. Then, the Court describes how MSA analysis has emerged as means to address the future medicals issue.   After detailing what actually constitutes a settlement in Florida, the Court turns to the question of whether the parties have an agreement to settle the claim.  
The Court concludes that the parties agreed on four out of five essential terms.  The term the parties could not agree upon was the LMSA issue, and asked the Court to fill in the blank on their behalf.  The Court declined the opportunity to do so.  
The Court distinguished this fact pattern from two others which appear routinely in other opinions addressing LMSA issues: 1) cases where the parties have a settlement agreement and agree that an LMSA is required, but cannot obtain review and approval of the LMSA from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”); and 2) cases where the parties have a settlement agreement but disagree as to whether those terms included the creation of an MSA.  Here, the parties did not ask the Court to enforce a settlement agreement; they asked the Court to assist with a critical term of a potential settlement agreement.  While the Court noted the “conscientious and diligent” efforts of counsel to uncover the issue, it was not within the Court’s dominion to gap fill with respect to this essential term of the potential settlement agreement.  

Takeaway.
This case is another example of the LMSA issue derailing what is (otherwise) a perfectly acceptable settlement agreement.  These issues should become much less obtrusive after CMS issues final guidance about liability settlements and future medical expenses under the MSP Act.  That guidance is expected to be released later this year.  Until then, the best approach is to proactively address the issue, and evidence exactly how you have arrived at your conclusion on the future medicals issue.  That approach, coupled with the Court’s conclusion in Guidry v. Chevron , highlights the importance of utilizing a formalized approach to MSP compliance.  When addressing future medicals issues under the MSP Act, a formalized approach will yield complaint results every time.    
Having a formalized settlement process that integrates these core concepts will achieve efficiencies and enhance the effectiveness of settlement programs while ensuring closure on the file.  Such a formalized settlement process should take into account the timing and coordination issues which may hinder successful LMSA analysis.  Thus, screening a case up front to verify entitlement and identifying a claimant as an MSA candidate early on is the proper launching point for any LMSA analysis.  As parties move towards resolution and identify the prospective gross award, they can then determine (consistent with CMS’s basic rules issued in the workers’ compensation settling) if a future medical allocation exists within the gross award, either in the form of a specific carve out or implicitly contained within the one undifferentiated lump sum.  

The DRI MSP Task Force continues to track relevant judicial opinions and guidance from CMS in order to ensure compliance for you and your clients.  We continue to stress the importance of utilizing a formalized approach in addressing the LMSA issue on every single claim, as that process will, in and of itself, ensuring compliance on the LMSA issue. 

[1] Early v. Carnival Corporation, No. 12-20478-CIV-Goodman (S.D. Fla. February 7, 2013).

[2] 42 U.S.C. §1395y(b)(2).

[3] The Court cites to a recent article published by the American Bar Association which was co-authored by John V. Cattie, Jr., DRI MSP Task Force Vice Chair.  See also Medicare Set-Aside Arrangements Under the Medicare Secondary Payer Act, 42 The Brief, n. 10, Fall 2012.

 

[4] Guidry, et al. v. Chevron USA, Inc., Civ. No. 6:10-cv-00868, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148942 (W.D. La. December 28, 2011).  

 

 

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Harvard University and the National Football League Players Association (“NFLPA”) are negotiating a deal with the NFL seeking a $100 million grant for the purpose of studying, diagnosing, and treating injuries and ailments suffered by players as a result of their football careers.


Dr. Lee Nadler, the Harvard Medical School Dean for clinical and translational research, attested to the groundbreaking nature of the proposed project, noting “[n]o one has ever studied the players [themselves] before.  There have been postmortem studies looking at the brains of previous players but not the players today.”

One has to wonder how generous the NFL will continue to be – after all, the league just donated $30 million to the National Institutes of Health last year to study brain injuries in NFL alumni.  Still, proponents of the Harvard study made sure to stress that this would not be simply another concussion study; instead, it would consider a whole host of health ailments potentially facing former NFL players  including chronic pain, depression, heart problems, and diabetes.  The scope of the proposed research is beyond anything that has been conducted to this point – preliminary estimates called for a nation-wide group of 200 NFL alumni drawn from a 1,000 person study group, with all participants being subject a wide array of medical tests.

Dr. Herman Taylor, one of the non-Harvard medical professionals retained for the study, stated, “Typically, when we do a test or medical study, we’re taking a snapshot.  What we want to do is see the full-length movie of what happens to a player over time.”

On the issue of funding, NFLPA Executive George Atallah noted, “Given the scope of health issues that NFL players are subject to, we are committed to making sure that enough money is allocated to get answers.”  However, because the research will be funded by a portion of league revenues, the actual amount the NFL is willing to put towards the study will likely not be determined until after the Super Bowl.

As originally published at Sportslawinsider.com on January 31, 2013
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A Pennsylvania district court in CAMICO Mutual Insurance Co. v. Heffler, Radetich & Saitta, LLP (E.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 2013), refused to allow an insurer access to its insured’s defense file, holding that that the insurer was not a client of the insured’s defense counsel.  There, CAMICO Mutual Insurance Co. insured Heffler, Radetich & Saitta, L.L.P. (“Heffler”) which was sued for misappropriating class action settlement proceeds.  In response to the suit, Heffler selected its defense counsel, and CAMICO agreed to pay defense counsel’s fees.  

CAMICO filed this declaratory judgment action seeking a finding apparently regarding the available policy limits.  In connection therewith, CAMICO sought production of certain documents related to the underlying lawsuit.  Heffler refused, and CAMICO moved to compel.  CAMICO argued the application of exceptions to the attorney-client privilege, which the parties agreed would have otherwise protected the documents from production.

CAMICO relied on the co-client exception, which concerns where two or more clients share the same attorney.  CAMICO argued that the exception applied because defense counsel represented the joint interests of Heffler and CAMICO with respect to the underlying lawsuit.  The district court disagreed, relying on several authorities for the proposition that the insurer is not automatically a client of defense counsel, even when it funds its insured’s defense.  Further, the district court found that based on the factual record, CAMICO was not a client of defense counsel.  Therefore, the district court denied CAMICO’s motion.

Notably, the district court glossed over three important issues, which merit a brief discussion here:  (1) Heffler’s choice of its own defense counsel, (2) the common interest exception as an exception to the attorney-client privilege, and (3) CAMICO’s providing a defense to Heffler in the underlying lawsuit while seeking to litigate the extent of coverage.  

First, that Heffler chose its own defense counsel made the arguments in favor of the co-client exception peculiar.  If CAMICO had appointed defense counsel for Heffler, there probably would have been a better argument for a co-client exception.  

Second, several courts recognize the common interest doctrine as an exception to the attorney-client privilege.  E.g., Waste Management, Inc. v. Int’l Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 144 Ill. 2d 178, 579 N.E.2d 322 (1991).   Although the district court asserted, without more, that CAMICO’s counsel did not share information with Heffler’s defense counsel, that is the point—CAMICO desired that defense counsel provide its counsel with otherwise privileged information.  This may have been a legitimate exception to the attorney-client privilege.   And, the Third Circuit and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania have not taken a position on whether they will follow the Illinois Supreme Court’s interpretation of the common interest exception as set forth in Waste Management. 

Third and finally, that CAMICO was not seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify suggests that CAMICO and Heffler could have a common interest with respect to the underlying lawsuit.  Most courts that have criticized the Waste Management reject, in pertinent part, the concept that the insurer can seek to vindicate its disclaimer of coverage in a declaratory judgment action, yet have a common interest with its abandoned insured in the underlying tort action.  While subject to debate, that CAMICO was merely seeking to litigate the available limits suggests that the common interest exception may be available here.

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On October 31, 2012, lawyers representing thousands of former NFL players filed an opposition brief to the NFL’s current motion to dismiss pending in U.S. District Court in Pennsylvania, insisting that based on the gravity of the harm incurred, their lawsuit against the League must be allowed to move forward.  The brief rejected the NFL’s contention that the action was essentially a labor dispute that needed to be resolved under the league’s collective bargaining agreement.

The Plaintiffs accused the NFL of “orchestrat[ing] a disinformation campaign,” insisting that the League “knew that players were exposed to risks of severe neurological injuries yet did nothing to prevent them.”  However, the League has, time and again, publicly denied that it knew of any long-term dangers posed by concussions.  Further, the NFL insists that it did not intentionally lie to players about the potential side effects.  Instead, it stated that it delegated the decisions about players’ conditions and return-to-play decisions to individual team doctors and trainers.

At this point, U.S. District Judge Anita Brody must decide how to proceed with the extremely cumbersome litigation.  If a settlement is not reached and the case is not dismissed, it is possible that the individual cases could be returned to the multiple districts where they originated forcing the parties to proceed with separate trials.

Ex-players reply to NFL’s motion to dismiss cases

As orrignally posted on Sports Law Insider on November 14, 2012
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Wisconsin Act 10

Posted on September 18, 2012 10:12 by Laurie E. Meyer

2011 Wisconsin Act 10 (“Act 10”), which was signed into law by Governor Walker in March 2011, dramatically restricted the collective bargaining rights of municipal bargaining unit employees, except police and fire employees, and required those employees to pay portions of their retirement and health insurance benefits.  

On Friday, September 14, 2012, in a suit brought by Madison teachers and a union representing Milwaukee workers, Dane County Circuit Court Judge Juan Colas held major portions of the law unconstitutional.  Judge Colas found that Act 10 violates the school and local employees’ rights to free speech, free association, and equal representation because it, among other things, caps union workers' raises but not those of nonunion employees and because it treats police and fire employees differently than other public workers.

The situation in Wisconsin is still quite fluid.  While local public sector union leaders have pledged that they will immediately seek to bargain on a host of issues made off-limits to collective bargaining by Act 10, Wisconsin Attorney General J.B. Van Hollen has sought a stay of the ruling pending his appeal.  To further complicate matters, two challenges to the law are still pending in federal court.  The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals will hear oral arguments on September 24th in connection with appeal of a federal judge’s March ruling which struck down portions of the law.  Another federal case brought on very similar grounds to the case heard by Judge Colas, has not yet been decided.  

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The Medicare, Medicare and SCHIP Extension Act of 2007 ("MMSEA") requires insurance companies and self-insured employers to report payments and settlements made to claimants who are Medicare-eligible.  42 U.S.C. § 1395y; 42 CFR § 411.24.   After several delays, this requirement was implemented in early 2011.  The Medicare reporting requirement only applies to claimants that are Medicare beneficiaries.  Nonetheless, because the penalties for non-reporting are severe, it may prove prudent to report the claim in all cases and allow The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS") to make the determination of whether the claimant is a Medicare beneficiary.  This becomes increasingly pressing considering that a claimant may become Medicare eligible during the pendency of the claim.  Consideration should be given in cases where the claimant is (1) 65 years or older; (2) on social security disability; (3) suffering from end stage renal disorder; or (4) has a reasonable expectation of becoming Medicare eligible in 6 months.  Currently, the CMS has established a schedule in which the reporting of certain claims will become mandatory.  The schedule is as follows: April 1, 2012, the reporting threshold was $50,000; on July 1, 2012 the threshold will be $25,000; on October 1, 2012 it will be $5,000; and by 2015 the threshold will drop to zero and all claims will have to be reported.

MMSEA mandates reporting requirements by which CMS recovers conditional payments from any interested parties; which includes self-insured employees or defense counsel.  The statute mandates reimbursement within 60 days of settlement or satisfaction of judgments.   Nonetheless, collection attempts by CMS within 60 days of settlement when the Medicare beneficiary disputes the reimbursement claim may be considered "irrational."  Haro v. Sebelius, 789 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1190 (D. Ariz., 2011).

There are steep repercussions for failing to comply with the Medicare reporting requirements.  Specifically, an insurer may be fined $1,000 per day per claimant for failing to report.   The United States may also bring a private action against any and all persons or interested parties responsible for making payments.  This may result in defense counsel being liable to CMS for reimbursement.   Nonetheless, at least one court has found that Congress never expressly made attorneys responsible for Medicare reimbursements. See Haro, 789 F. Supp. at 1192.

As a result of the mandatory requirements of reporting, it has become increasingly important for defense counsel to report potential claims to CMS.   In the initial phase of the claim, plaintiff's counsel should report the potential claim to CMS.  This information should be disclosed as early as possible in order to facilitate settlement discussions and satisfactions of judgments.  Further, defense counsel should direct discovery to obtain the claimants potential Medicare eligibility; such as requesting production of the claimant's Medicare card and Medicare conditional payment letter.  Defense counsel should also (1) include Medicare indemnification language in any settlement agreement; (2) include Medicaid and Medicare as an additional payee; and (3) tender proceeds with the disclaimer that CMS will be reimbursed.   The Supreme Court of New York took the position that the plaintiffs were responsible for satisfying the Medicare lien considering that when settlement was placed on the record, plaintiff's' counsel stated that they would hold harmless and release the settling defendants from the Medicaid and Medicare liens.  Fried v. City of New York, 940 N.Y.S. 2d 795, 803 (N.Y. Sup., 2012).

 

Marie Giraud is currently an associate in the Boston office of Morrison Mahoney LLP. 

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The release of this audio recording raises numerous issues.  Williams' career was already in serious jeopardy prior to the release of this recording, but now, he is virtually un-employable.  His rhetoric and tone exceed that which would be considered normal locker room speak, and leaves little doubt that bounties were indeed taking place.  Williams called for specific injuries to numerous San Francisco players, even suggesting players should attempt to go for the head of concussion-prone wide receiver Kyle Williams.  With the multitude of lawsuits already filed against the NFL related to concussion issues, this is pretty damning for Williams, the Saints, and the League as a whole.  It is possible, and perhaps even likely, that Commissioner Goodell could turn Williams' current indefinite suspension into a lifetime ban.  It seems as though Goodell has ample evidence to do so at this point, and he may need to take such a step to remain consistent with the NFL's present crusade in support of player safety.  

To that end, Goodell clearly has authority to discipline Williams, consistent with the NFL's Standard of Conduct: 


Standard of Conduct

While criminal activity is clearly outside the scope of permissible conduct, and persons who engage in criminal activity will be subject to discipline, the standard of conduct for persons employed in the NFL is considerably higher. It is not enough simply to avoid being found guilty of a crime.


Discipline may be imposed in any of the following circumstances:

  • Conduct that imposes inherent danger to the safety and well being of another person; and
  • Conduct that undermines or puts at risk the integrity and reputation of the NFL, NFL clubs, or NFL players.

It will also be interesting to see if this audio recording affects the ongoing appeal of Head Coach Sean Payton.  Payton's chances of succeeding on appeal of his year-long suspension were probably slim before this recording, but in light of the public outcry, it seems certain that Goodell will uphold Payton's suspension. If Payton was in the room during this speech (it appears that he was not at this point), and knew of the bounties (which he has admitted), he had a duty to report Williams and others involved, even if he did not partake in the scheme himself.  Goodell can fall back on the NFL's Standard of Conduct in this regard as well: 

Reporting of Incidents: The League must be advised promptly of any incident that may be a violation of this policy, and particularly when any conduct results in an arrest or other criminal charge.  Players and club employees must report any such incident to the club, which must then report it to NFL Security at (800) NFL-1099. Failure to report an incident will constitute conduct detrimental and will be taken into consideration in making disciplinary determination under this policy. Clubs are also required to report incidents that come to their attention.

Another interesting issue that could trigger litigation is the fact that this audio recording was allegedly not authorized for release.  This recording was captured during filmmaker Sean Pamphilon's work on an ESPN documentary entitled, "Run Ricky Run," which chronicled former Saints player Steve Gleason's fight with Lou Gehrig's disease.  However, Gleason, who expressed regret and disappointment over the release of the recording, apparently owns the rights to all recordings compiled during the filming.  Gleason conceivably could bring an action against Pamphilon for the unauthorized release, though it could be difficult for Gleason to prove damages, given the circumstances. 

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A recent article published on socialmediatoday.com suggests that unlike other professional industries, health care providers have been slow to engage on social media.  The article posits that the key reasons for their reluctance stem from concerns about accountability and privacy.  At its root, the issue seems to be that between the protections afforded under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and more generalized notions of physician-patient confidentiality, many providers are concerned that a presence in social media threatens patient confidentiality and exposes them to expanded liability.  The article makes the point that a lack of social media presence is itself risky for health care providers, and argues that the risk of not establishing a presence subjects providers to potentially negative commentary and characterization.

The risks to physicians, hospitals and similar providers posed by interaction on social media are analogous to a large extent to those faced by lawyers, a group which in my experience has fairly enthusiastically embraced social media, and opportunities for professional on-line communication and networking.  Like physicians, lawyers are bound by client confidentiality.  We are also bound by rules of professional conduct that regulate what we are permitted to communicate about our services and our experience.  This does (or should) cause us to be cautious and deliberative when engaging social media, particularly when we do so under color of our profession and/or our firm.  Notwithstanding these restrictions, lawyers have been active in social media for many years.

On the other hand, health care providers have to be concerned about additional scrutiny that we lawyers do not.  This includes state and federal oversight associated with Medicare and Medicaid, as well as board licensure review.  Health care providers also face heightened attention and expectations of accountability when there is a bad patient outcome.  Providers may be understandably leery of engaging in yet another form of exposure and communication in which there is certainly opportunity for “bad press.”  However, as the socialmediatoday.com article suggests, media silence can be detrimental both from a financial point of view and in the arena of public opinion.  Even social media silence.

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